India’s Economic, Financial and Social Performance –
An analysis of reasons for pre and post Covid slow down
Rohit Kumar Parmar Free lance [1]
IES (Retd)
Former Senior Economic Adviser
Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution
Outline:
Pre-Covid, the average per capita income decreased by (-) 0.57 percent from Rs. 100,267 in 2017-18 to Rs. 99,694 in 2020-21 and food prices increased by around 31 percent, implying a proportionate reduction in (food) consumption. Average household debt from institutional sources increased by 5.8 percent over two years and six months (Reserve Bank of India 2021 I). Households dipped into past savings by reduced deposits (Table 4). Decline in the nutritional status of children under 5 years during 2015-16 and 2019-20 (Government of India (2020 NFHS -5).
Reasons for slowdown from 2017-19 include sucking out of wealth and cash from the economy; failing to fully pass through reduction of global fuel prices losing opportunities to cut costs and turn competitive; wasteful expenditure on a plethora of schemes and programmes with changing goal posts; complicated and bureaucratic GST failing to meet the objectives; overregulation in the economy with negligible enforcement; very little being done to recognise and address the problem of slowdown.
Continuing in a manner `business as usual’ adding to (cost push) inflation, by increasing taxes especially through cess, deficit and borrowing, worsening condition of the poor, increasing ratio and absolute number of poor, increasing income inequality,
Need to sharply cut government expenditure, reduce tax burden on the poor, take steps to simplify procedures to make economy competitive and start growing. An uncompetitive economy driven by excess government spending is not a sustainable one.
I Introduction:
A second review [2] of India’s performance in select Economic, Financial and Social spheres after six months, attempts to determine reasons for pre and post Covid slowdown. This is warranted since growth significantly slowed down from financial year 2017-18, [3] the reasons for which were not Covid. Similarly, the slowdown during 2019-20 relates to the pre-Covid period. [4] This review would help to identify reasons for pre-Covid slowdown distinct from the post-Covid slowdown. The resulting remedies would also be different. There is a need to address reasons for the pre-Covid slowdown, to restore both growth rate to pre-2017-18 levels and GDP to 2019-20 levels. (Tables 1 & 2).
In the present analysis data available from government sources is used. However, where government data is not available, other sources are tapped. In respect of tiny and informal sectors, anecdotal evidence is relied upon. Government and NGOs may consider improving availability of data in the tiny and informal sectors by resorting to special surveys. Case studies can also be prepared by NGOs.
As stated in the first review, before the onset of the COVID crisis, the rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined to less than half from a high of 8.3 per cent in 2016-17 to 4.0 per cent in 2019-20, close to the Hindu rate of growth. This downtrend in growth continued as deceleration during the COVID year 2020-21, when the rate of growth in GDP is estimated to decline by (-) 7.3 per cent. The Pre-COVID reduction in growth rate of GDP needs revival and the post-COVID decline, requires recovery. It is important to recognise the difference between the two, identify separately reasons for the same and also suggest separate solutions.
II Macro Performance of Indian Economy:
The broad Macro picture that emerged is a slowdown in the economy translating to deceleration during Covid, accompanied with rising inflation especially food inflation and worsening social indicators, sans recognition or measures to address them.
As in the first review, two groups of macro indicators are adopted for the assessment – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Inflation (Consumer and Wholesale Prices). In addition to GDP, per capita GDP and select components of GDP– Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE), Government Final Consumption Expenditure (GFCE), Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) are also taken up in this review.
III.1 Gross Domestic Product/ per capita GDP
The growth rate of GDP and per capita GDP since 2015-16 is summarised in Table 1 below. Growth rate of GDP during 2019-20 at 4.0 percent is less than half the growth rate of 8.3 percent in 2016-17, an annual reduction of 15.4 per cent. Similarly, Growth rate in per capita GDP during 2019-20 at 3.0 percent is 45 percent the growth rate of 6.6 percent in 2015-16, an annual reduction of 18.6 percent. These reductions are serious cause of concern, reasons for which should be identified and remedial steps taken to restore growth.
Table 1
A first step to restoring growth rate to 2016-17 level of 8.3 is to start reporting the actual level of GDP and per capita GDP as a percentage of the 2019-20 level. Otherwise, reporting of growth rates from low base/s tends to misrepresent the level/performance of the economy. For example, GDP in 2020-21 (Rs. 13512749 cr) is only 93 percent of GDP in 2019-20 (Rs. 14569268 cr). The much touted inverted V growth argument should also state whether the 2019-20 level can be achieved.
This is important since the dip in India’s growth rate was one of the highest. [5] The first review (Parmar, 2020) had argued that the projected positive and higher growth rate during 2021 (i.e., 2021-22) may not be adequate to wipe out the reduction in the Economy during 2020-21.
III.2 Components of Gross Domestic Product
The Annual growth of Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE), Government Final Consumption Expenditure (GFCE), Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), since 2015-16 is summarised in Table 2 below. While both PFCE and GFCF have decreased in line with GDP, GFCE has recorded an increase.
Table 2
The growth rate of Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) continued to decline from its peak of 8.1 percent in 2016-17, when GDP recorded the highest growth rate. PFCE during 2020-21, declined by (-) 9.1 per cent as against an increase of 5.5 percent during 2019-21, which is an effective reduction of 14.6 percentage points. The reduction in PFCE (of (-) 9.1 percent) is 1.8 percentage points more than the reduction in GDP. The level of PFCE in 2020-21 is close to the level of PFCE in 2017-18, i.e. three years ago. These reductions are a matter of concern, implications of which are discussed in the social section of this discussion.
Government Final Consumption Expenditure (GFCE), however, is estimated to grow at nearly the pre-covid rate during 2020-21, in a manner `business as usual’. During the lockdown of 54 days, with closedown of non-essential activity, there should have been proportionate reduction in GFCE. A higher government expenditure as in normal times is a waste. There is little documented evidence that GFCE was directed towards humanitarian relief.
As per GOI (2021), the figure of major subsidies (especially food subsidies) increased by 162 percent from Rs.2.27 lakh crore in 2020-21 (BE) to Rs. 5.97 lakh crore in 2020-21 (RE). Major subsidies constituted 37.6 percent of the GFCE, used for inefficient food operations of FCI and warehousing corporations/ activities. The expenditure on major subsidies is 4.4 per cent of GDP.
A High Level Committee (HLC) chaired by Shri Shanta Kumar in 2015 (Shanta Kumar, 2015)
inter-alia observed/ recommended
(a) That diversion of grains from PDS amounted to 46.7 percent in 2011-12 (based on calculations of offtake from central pool and NSSO's (68th round) consumption data from PDS),
(b) Country had huge surplus grain stocks, much above the buffer stock norms, even when cereal inflation was hovering between 8-12 percent in the last few years,
(c) This indicates that while India has moved away from shortages of 1960s, into surpluses of cereals in post-2010 period, food management system, of which FCI is an integral part, has not been able to deliver on its objectives efficiently. The benefits of procurement have not gone to larger number of farmers beyond a few states, and leakages in TPDS remain unacceptably high. Needless to say, this necessitates a re-look at the very role and functions of FCI within the ambit of overall food management systems, and concerns of food security.
In the light of the above recommendations, a simple interpretation is that Rs. 5.97 lakh crore in 2020-21, largely food subsidy is neither reaching the farmer or the poor and as wasteful expenditure should not have been incurred.
GFCE should have recorded a decrease as PFCE and GCFC, which did not happen. In the absence of a decrease in GFCE, government would have a relatively higher deficit or higher borrowing or need to increase taxes, all of which the government did, fueling inflation. As per Press Note (GOI, 2021), there is a decrease in the Net Taxes on Products by (-) 22. 51 percent from Rs. 1297799 cr in 2019-20 to Rs. 1059310 cr in 2020-21, which alone was adequate reason to curtail the GFCE.
Transfer/ compensation to state governments for 2020-21, was completed on July 27, 2021. (PIB Press Note (GOI, 2021 IV). During 2021-22 additional borrowings are likely to be resorted to compensate states for shortfall in GST collection. This is evidence of shortage of resources and need to curtail expenditure by cutting GFCE.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) recorded a decrease of (-) 10.8 percent, in recognition of the fact that there is idle capacity in the economy and further expansion would result in increasing idle capacity and decrease returns on investment. A similar response happened in the recent past, when responding to a high GDP growth rate of 8.2 per cent in 2016-17, GFCF recorded an increase of 28.3 percent only to roll back to a negative growth in 2018-19 of (-) 7.7 percent as GDP growth rate decreased to 7.0 percent.
III.3 Reasons for slowdown of GDP/ per capita GDP from 2017-18
The reasons for slowdown in GDP/ per capita GDP require a detailed analysis, which being beyond the scope of this discussion, is not attempted here. The growth of Indian economy has been subjected to several shocks due to actions of government. A simple listing of some of reasons for slowdown follows.
The impact of de-monetisation [6] despite all the laudable but shifting objectives claimed by the government, sucked out capital and wealth from the economy. This left players in the economy deprived of financial buffer and made them vulnerable even to small changes/ disruptions in business. Wherever, conversion of old currency to new took place, there was money and time cost. GDP growth rate slumped from 7.1 percent in Q3 to 6.1 percent Q4 2016-17, the quarter succeeding the demonetisation. GDP growth rate fell from 8.3 percent in 2016-17 to 7.0 percent in 2017-18 and has continued to decline.
There were at least two opportunities available in the Indian economy to cut costs and turn efficient and increase growth, which were stifled by government decision to not fully pass through the reduction in global oil prices. A full pass through would have helped business, especially small and tiny business to cut input costs and so losses and/or improve margins and stay afloat and healthy. This would possibly also have resulted in cost cutting of final products in some cases and so higher volumes, which would also have contributed to higher growth.
The global oil prices dipped by 25 percent in 2018. During the first half of 2020, global oil prices dipped by around 72 percent. To further worsen the situation, a cess of Rs. 2.5 on petrol and Rs. 4 on diesel was imposed in budget 2021-22. Subsequent increases in global oil prices were fully passed on to the consumer as if there was no fall in global prices in the past, putting the self paying consumer in double jeopardy.
On oil economics of the Indian economy, there are factors that have hurt efficiency of the economy making it a high cost one. First is the daily revision of petrol and diesel prices in a non-transparent system by the oil companies, forcing business to factor in uncertainty of price. Second is the impact of ending subsidy on diesel and enhancing the cost of transportation of goods, and so pushing up costs of all goods, passenger transport and agricultural operations.
Third is the incidence of burden of petrol/ diesel cost and price increases. Cost of petrol/ diesel and price increases are not borne by employees of government, public sector, autonomous bodies, etc., nor by the private sector who can book it as expenses. [7] Cost of petrol/ diesel and price increases are borne largely by self employed individuals who have private cars/ two wheelers and/or get a fixed amount of money for transport. These include large number of delivery personnel who get piece rate for delivery, irrespective of the cost of petrol/diesel. It also includes small business/transport operators who are unable to increase the cost of service because of some reason.
The additional revenue so earned from the taxes on POL in the form of additional excise duty/ cess was supposedly spent in expanding schemes/ programmes for benefits to weaker sections of society without actually benefiting them. The resources were used in pilot schemes, in setting up data bases, separately for each state, renaming schemes and programmes, partially changing schemes and programmes, which never reach the entire target group. Each of these supported expenditures on bureaucracy, intermediate organizations and media.
Direct benefits were replaced by insurance covers and the insured sum (which is the ceiling of entitlement) wrongly projected as the benefit to the user. This was accompanied with a continued neglect of the public/state health system. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Economic Survey (Vol I, Chapter 05, 2020-21) has reported that India has one of the highest Out of Pocket Expenditure (OOPE) on health. This high incidence should have warranted an increase in the expenditure on public health and not resort to insurance covers.
Goods and Services Tax introduced wef July 1, 2017 has not met any of the stated goals for the following reasons.
(i) There is no single rate for GST and defeats the purpose of GST. Differential rates ensure continued lobbying, rent seeking and collection. An additional layer has been added for changes -a meeting of the GST council,
(ii) If there was no single rate GST, services should have continued to be taxed at taxed @ 14 percent. This avoidably increased the cost of services -telecom, energy, transport, etc.,
(iii) Far too many bureaucratic procedures and returns have increased cost of compliance to prohibitive levels,
(iv) Input tax credit system is too complicated. The decision for the construction sector of fixed percentage as input tax credit should be extended to all sectors, at the option of the payer, [8]
(v) A large section of tiny, micro and small enterprises pay GST but are not able to avail any input tax credit. A mechanism to provide input tax credit for this group is necessary on grounds of equity and should be (have been) considered,
(vi) Checking documents at inter-state borders has nullified the biggest projected advantage of faster movement of goods,
(vii) Both the centre and states have put `all eggs in one basket’ and the risk is starkly visible.
There is a need for statesmanship and acknowledgement of errors in the formulation of GST and a review after an anonymous and frank discussion.
The present government has possibly passed the largest number of legislations, which has created a situation of over- regulation sans enforcement. A frank and off the record discussion with players would reveal limitations of this over-regulation, since, associated rules, guidelines, infrastructure to implement have not been introduced.
IV Inflation
From low and negative inflation rates (measured in terms of wholesale prices) recorded during 2015-18, resulting from a sharp fall in global oil and some commodity prices, India has since 2018 been recording very high rates of inflation, especially Food inflation. (Table 3)
The high rates of inflation from 2017-18 were the outcome of apportioning by the government (Centre through an increase in duties and the States because of ad-valorem effect and increase in state taxes and levies), instead of full pass through of the fall in global oil prices to the consumer, [9] making the Indian economy a high cost and less competitive one. In other deregulated economies, the pass over of the fall in global oil prices was full.
Table 3
There are dimensions of inflation that cause additional concern. (Table 3) First, is the higher inflation at retail than at wholesale level. This implies `that not only are prices at the retail level higher, when compared to wholesale level, they also increase at higher rates’. This inter-alia suggests greater imperfection in the retail markets and the need to enhance competition by removing controls and barriers to entry, especially at the retail level.
The Second concern is higher inflation in food articles, compared to overall consumer prices (as captured by CPI-IW). In fact, food inflation (CPI Food) during 2019-20 was nearly 12 percentage points higher than retail inflation (CPI-IW). The gap has closed but food inflation at more than 5 per cent when Per Capita GDP declined by (-) 8.2 percent suggests that large section of the population is forced to reduce expenditure on Food.
V Financial Sector Review
The financial sector faced several challenges – transiting to digital format of payment/transactions at retail level with poor connectivity and an economy/ population not equipped to use it. Several teething problems continue to be observed in the process of digitisation. Volume of (digital) transactions are not adequate to cover additional cost of digitisation, especially for public sector. Public Sector Banks have also been subject to transition costs of merger which got co-timed with the Covid crisis. [10] The merged banks also carried losses and large NPAs impacting the profitability of the new entity.
Non-resolution of NPAs and the need to provide for them, taking away resources that could be put to alternate uses has impacted banks. The resolution of NPAs under IBC slowed down due to suspension of the process and changing goal posts by increasing threshold limits (PIB Press Note, GOI, 2021 I).
To the above, are added problems to restructure repayment of outstanding loans on account of COVID, with no clarity on who would pick up the tab. The government because of limitations of resources is unwilling/ unable to pick up the additional costs (interest) of restructured loans and the banking sector is unable to do so because it shall further erode their net worth.
In this background, a simple analysis of Money Supply, currency and demand deposits follows.
The Growth of Money Supply (M3) an indicator of liquidity, finance and credit to the economy, continued to decrease from 10.6 per cent in 2018-19 to 8.8 per cent in 2019-20 and to 0.9 in 2020-21. Clearly growth of money supply is not a factor contributing to inflation. Growth of currency holding also continued to decrease from 16.8 per cent in 2018-19 to 14.0 per cent 2019-20 to (-) 0.1 on 2020-21.
Growth of demand deposits decreased from 9.6. per cent in 2018-19 to 6.8 per cent 2019-20 but picked up to 9.1 in 2020-21. However, growth of demand deposits during the current financial year (till June 5, 2021) decreased by (-) 8.3 per cent. This is strong evidence of sections of the population drawing into their past savings.
Table 4
VI Social Review:
The implications of previous section/s on the social aspects follows.
Aggregate level
With falling GDP and per Capita GDP growth rates, there is a near certain slowdown in the rate of reduction of poverty; possibly an increase in absolute numbers and rate.
Malnutrition
Given the fact that a large proportion of household expenditure is on food, there would have been a reduction on this (food expenditure) and associated implications. The NFHS-5 (for 2019-20) indicates decline in nutritional status of children under 5 years (compared to 2015-16) and anaemia being much higher among women compared to men. The decline in nutrition of children under 5 and higher anaemia in women, would have worsened in 2020-21, due to the continued slowdown in growth and the fact that during the lockdown there was closure of the Aanganwadis.
One is tempted to argue (as in the first review) that decline in nutritional status among children under 5 years, suggests the need to re-appraise and re-evaluate the Rashtriya Poshan Abhiyan and the Poshan Maah campaign for its implementation/ delivery.
However, the only remedy to nutrition and related issues is removal of poverty and is possible only if growth revives. Schemes and programmes equipped with inefficiencies, seldom reach the target group and have the ability to expand bureaucracy at a very high cost. This aspect has been debated at length in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1993), some extracts of which are at Annexure A. The author hopes that this is taken into consideration and unnecessary skew towards schemes and programmes be revisited. Infact there should be pruning down of the number of schemes and associated expenditure to less than half to start with, restricting it to food, shelter, health, education, sanitation and employment. It makes little sense to talk of markets, when there are efforts to distort the same.
Household debt
The strong possibility that households were slipping further into debt was confirmed by RBI (2021 I). As per RBI (2021 I) Household debt to GDP ratio, which has been steadily increasing since Q1:2018-19 rose from 31.3 percent to 35.4 per cent in Q1:2020-21 and to 37.1 percent in Q2:2020-21. During these two years and six months, household debt increased by 5.8 percentage points, most of which is in the pre-covid period, with high probability of further increase during the Covid crisis. The increasing household debt since Q1 2018-19 coincides with 2017-18, when growth rate of GDP started to slow-down.
Data for India’s household debt, presented by RBI (2021 I), however, does not include indebtedness of the non-institutional sector. A large proportion of household borrowing is from the informal sector, where interest rates are in the range of 4 – 5 percent per month and also compounded monthly. Family assets are pledged to borrow at these high rates. Even though it is very risky (documenting or surveying), maybe on an anecdotal basis, NGOs should document a few case studies on this.
It is important to recognize that households borrow to meet the gap between income and expenditure to meet their daily (as opposed to investment) needs. The ways to reduce debt when expenditures are at bear minimum, is to step up incomes and/or to reduce cost of living. On both these counts, action/s and policies have been contra impacting. First, there has been little attempt/success in increasing per capita incomes by reviving growth. Second cost of living is increasing driven by cost push inflation through additional indirect taxes, prices of petrol and diesel, and rise of food prices. [11]
A possible hope of humanitarian relief is stuck in non-portable ration cards, excluding almost all migrant labour (including within the state) and a large section of the population. In a disaster situation, offering borrowing incentives for state government as a lever, for introducing portable ration cards does not provide ration/food to the poor. (PIB Press Note, GOI, 2021 III),
Lockdown impact
The government while introducing lockdown appears to have failed to visualize humanitarian needs of a large section of the population, including both migrant and non-migrant labour. A possibility/hope of recognition and relief got embroiled in the issues of jurisdiction between the centre and state governments, leaving the poor without food or a place to stay. To place on record efforts by some NGOs and non-formal groups who did feed the stranded poor, there are lots of unhappiness about the repeated serving of unpalatable khichdi by government agencies.
At the time of pandemic, when a large portion of the population was without jobs and food, public money was used to subsidise inefficient food operations of FCI and warehousing corporations/ activities. Free food distribution to all without any riders would have helped use up some of the buffer stock of food grains, saved warehousing and related costs. However, the distribution of free food grains or launch of common kitchens to feed the poor and migrant labourer without riders was negligible. This was also witnessed during the recent second wave, when lockdown was imposed by the states.
VII Way forward
The revival of the Indian economy and tackling the covid crisis requires statesmanship and a revisit of the several paradigms adopted for the last 5 years and needs to be done. To quote Reserve Bank of India (2021 II)
` The MPC also decided to continue with the accommodative stance as long as necessary to revive and sustain growth on a durable basis and continue to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on the economy, while ensuring that inflation remains within the target going forward.’
The MPC places growth as top priority, which can be done by the central government undoing a lot of their actions done since 2016-17. MPC also speaks of inflation remaining within target, which as per the RBI is 4 ± 2 percent. Government may also consider rolling back most of their actions that has fueled a cost-push inflation.
Annexure A
Extracts from `India’s Economic Reforms’, Jagdish Bhagwati and T.N.Srinivasan, July 1993, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs
Page 1
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End Notes
[1] Author has in posts on his website (https://rohitkparmar.wixsite.com/site), twitter (https://twitter.com/rohitkparmar?s=09), facebook (https://www.facebook.com/rohit.parmar.5268750/), linkedin (https://www.linkedin.com/in/rohit-kumar-parmar-841b4724) been writing on impact of Covid and can be reached at rohitkparmar@yahoo.com. [2] The first review done by the author dates December 20, 2020 and is available at https://rohitkparmar.wixsite.com/site/post/india-s-economic-financial-and-social-performance-during-2020 [3] Wherever a year is written in the format 2017-18 it denotes financial year. [4] National lockdown commenced on 24/25 March 2020. [5] As per IMF (2021), the growth rate of India’s GDP in a set of 30 economies was negative and the eighth lowest. [6] Demonetization was announced on November 8, 2016. [7] The list of free riders is long, and the reader can add to it. [8] See post by author in Social Media https://www.facebook.com/rohit.parmar.5268750/posts/3682919898498082 [9] See posts of the author in the social media on this issue. https://www.facebook.com/rohit.parmar.5268750/posts/2636742796449136 https://www.facebook.com/rohit.parmar.5268750/posts/2646386558818093 https://www.facebook.com/rohit.parmar.5268750/posts/2668528126603936 [10] Public Sector Banks were merged into 7 large banks wef 01.04.2020. PIB Press Note (GOI, 2020 II) [11] Inflation in India-Pre and Post Covid Times-a discussion by the present author https://rohitkparmar.wixsite.com/site/post/inflation-in-india-pre-and-post-covid-times-a-discussion
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